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Abstract 
The present crisis has forced almost all countries to introduce an active 
economic policy. A lot of attention has been paid to fiscal policy and taxes in 
Poland. The measures taken in Poland differ considerably from global standards 
and decisions concerning taxes have been generally political in nature. The 
paper presents solutions in fiscal policy applied in Poland and explains the 
specificity of Poland’s economy and its anti-crisis policy. 
1. Introduction 
The theory of economics presents definitely diversified views on the 
origins of crises. There are two radically different opinions. According to the 
first, crises occur because governments excessively restrict market mechanisms. 
The economy can achieve the state of equilibrium only through the decreased 
state intervention and free market mechanisms. These views, dating back to 
classic economics have been reflected in many later trends (Neo-classics, 
Monetarists). The impact of such approach on the economic policy in the times 
of current crisis has been severely limited in many countries. 
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According to another approach crises are a consequence of the weakness 
of market mechanisms and overcoming them requires increased state 
interference. This reasoning stems from the concept of John Maynard Keynes, 
whose views were rejected in the mid-1970s in the aftermath of the 1973 – 1975 
crisis and supplanted by Neo-classic theory. Today, however, we are observing 
the renaissance of these trends which, in many countries, begin to form the basis 
for economic policies. 
Most countries seem to focus on activities aimed at preventing economy 
against too rapid economic fluctuations and reacting promptly at the sight of first 
symptoms of crisis. Previously, they focused on removing negative effects of the 
downturn. The current crisis shows that it is not always successful. However, 
one should generally appreciate the pace of legislative change, its large scope, 
and the involvement of large financial resources. This is evident in the U.S. and 
the European Union countries. Against this background Poland presents an 
entirely different attitude, where the legislative procedure takes a very long time, 
the scope of change is modest, and the resources insignificant.  
2. The Anti-crisis Policy in the USA and European Union 
The countries of the Western Europe apply anti-crisis policy of short-term 
demand fiscal and monetary policies and long-term policy, which is defined as  
a developmental intervention. Short term actions relatively quickly affect 
economy (e.g. within few months) and focus on demand aspects (they tend to 
increase demand). A wide range of instruments is involved, (tax system, 
government expenditure) within fiscal policy and (regulation of interest and 
exchange rates) within monetary policy. There is a widespread belief that active 
fiscal policy may be more effective in reviving economy and monetary policy in 
preventing it overheating. There are many doubts raised in the theory of 
economy whether such short term demand policy is effective. Mistakes can be 
made causing such negative effects which undermine legitimacy of actions 
taken. Despite these reservations and uncertainties, fiscal and monetary 
instruments are used on a wide scale (the latter to a smaller degree) during the 
present crisis in the USA and countries of Western Europe. Poland is an 
exception in this respect – actions are taken on a small scale here. There are 
fears that they might lead to undesired results. This paper will present evaluation 
of such different approaches.  
The present crisis is often compared to the biggest downturns of 1929 – 
1933 and of 1973 – 1975 and this justified due to the scale of difficulty and 
geographical coverage. No other crisis did have an adverse effect on so many 
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countries at almost the same time. One should note that these two great 
downturns revealed so many problems, difficult to explain and overcome, that in 
consequence economic theories of the past have been replaced with new 
doctrines. The prompt dissemination of John M. Keynes’ theory after 1929 – 
1933 and Milton Friedman’s after 1973 – 1975 is a symbol of radical changes. 
Therefore it seems justified to expect distinctive change of economic doctrine 
setting out the shape of global economic policy. Monitoring present actions one 
may expect that the new doctrine will refer to J.M. Keynes’ views and will 
introduce more state regulation of economy and perhaps also increase the role of 
the state as an owner. Such prospects are rejected or rather reluctantly adopted in 
Poland. However, it seems impossible that Polish politicians and liberal 
economists manage to convince most economists to their ideas. 
Apart from demand and short-term fiscal and monetary measures, the 
second element of anti-crisis policy is considered, the so-called development 
interventionism, which affects supply aspects of economy in the long-term. This 
involves state intervention in: 
• Development of technical infrastructure (e.g. highways, airports, high-speed 
trains, telecommunications), 
• Development of social infrastructure (such as education and high quality 
health services), 
• Support of national technical ideas (science, research and development 
programs), 
• Stabilisation of money supply. 
It is popular belief that development intervention is the right way to 
increase the resilience of the economy to downturn. In this respect, Poland has 
successfully achieved only the stable money supply but still faces: 
• embarrassing indolence in the construction of highways (a maximum of 
several dozens of kilometres per year),  
• underdeveloped air transport (all Polish airports combined handle less 
passengers than a fairly large airport in Western Europe),  
• a complete lack of high-speed railway lines,  
• low level of health care and higher education (the best Polish universities 
rank low on the global list of best universities),  
• low level of expenditure on education (about 0.57% of GDP, where most 
countries spend 2 - 3%). 
But also issues related to the effectiveness of development intervention 
the present crisis raises many questions and doubts. It is not self-evident that 
countries with a good level of infrastructure are undergoing the crisis smoothly. 
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Since the beginning of the current crisis most countries of major 
importance for the global economy carry out active and expansionary fiscal 
policy aimed at stimulating investment and consumer demand. Since the 
beginning of the current crisis most countries of major importance for the global 
economy carry out active and expansionary fiscal policy aimed at stimulating 
investment and consumer demand. Hundreds of billions or even trillions of 
dollars and euros flow into economies. This leads to a sharp increase in the 
budget deficit, accounting for example, from a few to several per cent of GDP in 
one year in the U.S., UK and Ireland. Consumer demand is stimulated by 
lowering taxes (directly or indirectly), but mostly for low-income people 
(because of their high propensity to consume). ). In order to speed up flow of 
money and shopping, President George W. Bush gave the poorest citizens 
vouchers worth U.S. $ 180 billion. This solution was continued by President 
Barack Obama and some European countries. For example, José Luis Zapatero, 
Spanish Prime Minister along with additional money asked the public to spend 
the money as soon as possible, and if they had no idea what to buy, advised them 
to spend it for parties in expensive restaurants. New programs in infrastructure 
arise, financed with public funds. In the U.S., President Obama is preparing very 
expensive reforms in health care and education, constructing and expanding 
highways and the Internet, supports environmental investments, including those 
directed towards reducing the greenhouse effect. Similar steps (although often 
on a smaller scale), are taken by the European Union and other countries 
(Switzerland, Norway). Sometimes Poland may benefit from these additional 
funds, provided it is capable of spending these funds during the crisis (hundreds 
of millions of euros for construction of facilities reducing CO2 emissions in 
Belchatow and the construction of the port for deliveries of liquefied gas in 
Swinoujscie). The money must be spent by the end of 2010. Some banks and 
other financial institutions receive huge subsidies and, eventually, also 
companies from the real sphere (spectacular decisions concerning General 
Motors). In practice, this is a return to the nationalization of important economic 
entities in the financial and real spheres. 
But here arises a dilemma. How should the state react towards entities 
over which it takes control (these are usually very large entities, of key 
importance for the economy). Should the state:  
• be a passive investor, but then lose its ability to influence the remedial 
programs and select executives, which can lead to waste of public resources 
and public disapproval (potential voters) or 
• be an active investor, who affects the composition of supervisory and 
management boards, and recovery plans and determines salaries of managers 
(usually the upper limit). Public opinion is generally more willing to accept 
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this latter approach. It means limiting the role of market mechanisms in 
favour of administrative action. However, this poses a threat of decreasing 
effectiveness in the long term. 
The tax system is considered as an important source of financing active 
fiscal policy. Some countries (USA, UK) have already increased the tax burden. 
Increased taxes will also play an important role in programs restoring budgetary 
balance in the future. Leading U.S. economists, including Nobel Prize winners 
Joseph Stiglitz, Edmund S. Phelps, and Paul Krugman encourage using such 
measures. 
Jeffrey Sachs, a well-known in Poland American economist (in the early 
1990's a principal adviser to the Polish government on international economic 
issues and who had a major impact on the views of Poland’s Minister of 
Finance, Leszek Balcerowicz and his program) has undergone an interesting and 
surprising change of his views. Currently, Jeffrey Sachs, while assessing the 
economic policy in the U.S, states: “Ronald Reagan poorly diagnosed stagflation 
and took course for future disaster. Together with his colleagues he wrongly 
concluded that the problem lay in government regulation and in high taxes and 
allowances ... by cutting taxes, Reagan made it impossible for us, for a whole 
generation, to invest in basic infrastructure. Financial deregulation on a large 
scale, initiated in his time, led to the current disaster ... In the 1990s share of tax 
revenues in GDP was still low, and Washington continued to deconstruct social 
security system and rapidly deregulated financial market”(Sachs, „Gazeta 
Wyborcza”, 2008). The government of George W. Bush has been similarly 
assessed, mainly due to tax cuts. J. Sachs believes that America must overcome 
an aversion to taxes and says: “... our problems require a reliable fiscal program, 
which would provide for an increased share of tax revenues in GDP in the next 
decade ... Money must be found for urgent investments at home and overseas. 
The increased tax base may be the only source....” 
3. The GDP and Public Finance in UE between 2007 and 2009) 
Data on the GDP growth in EU countries indicate that the crisis was 
demonstrated to the greatest extent in the Baltic countries. These countries were 
regarded as leaders of transformation. In the years 2006 - 2007 these countries 
recorded a GDP growth rate of 10% and higher. The collapse of the economy 
became strongly apparent in those countries already in 2008 (a decrease of GDP 
by 4-5%), and in 2009 a negative growth rate reached 18% in Latvia and 14% in 
Estonia and Lithuania). Also previously stable countries: Denmark, Germany, 
Austria, and Sweden in 2009 recorded a 5% drop in GDP, and Finland up to 8%. 
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Poland was the only EU-27 country which recorded a positive growth rate of 
1.7% of GDP and appeared as a "green island" against other EU countries in the 
deep crisis. 
EU countries (except Ireland and United Kingdom) were characterised by 
a high proportion of public expenditure in GDP. Between 1998 and 2007 these 
countries launched various disciplinary measures to reduce public spending. The 
data in Table 2 indicate that these actions have produced a clear effect in 11 of 
the 15 countries of the "old EU". Public expenditure did not decrease during this 
period only in Ireland, Greece, Portugal, and United Kingdom. 
Table 1. Real GDP growth rate (2006-2009) 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Belgium 2.7 2.9 1.0 -2.8 
Bulgaria 6.5 6.4 6.2 -4.9 
Czech Republic 6.8 6.1 2.5 -4.1 
Denmark 3.4 1.6 -1.1 -5.2 
Germany 3.4 2.7 1.0 -4.7 
Estonia 10.6 6.9 -5.1 -13.9 
Ireland 5.3 5.6 -3.5 -7.6 
Greece 5.2 4.3 1.0 -2.0 
Spain 4.0 3.6 0.9 -3.7 
France 2.2 2.4 0.2 -2.6 
Italy 2.0 1.5 -1.3 -5.0 
Cyprus 4.1 5.1 3.6 -1.7 
Latvia 12.2 10.0 -4.2 -18.0 
Lithuania 7.8 9.8 2.9 -14.7 
Luxembourg 5.0 6.6 1.4 -3.7 
Hungary 3.5 0.8 0.8 -6.7 
Malta 3.3 3.9 2.7 -1.9 
Netherlands 3.4 3.9 1.9 -3.9 
Austria 3.6 3.7 2.2 -3.9 
Poland 6.2 6.8 5.1 1.7 
Portugal 1.4 2.4 0.0 -2.5 
Romania 7.9 6.3 7.3 -7.1 
Slovenia 5.9 6.9 3.7 -8.1 
Slovakia 8.5 10.5 5.8 -4.8 
Finland 4.4 5.3 0.9 -8.2 
Sweden 4.3 3.3 -0.6 -5.3 
United Kingdom 2.8 2.7 -0.1 -4.9 
UE-27 3.2 3.0 0.5 -4.2 
Source: Eurostat, Date of extraction Feb.14, 2011, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
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EU struggles with disciplining public finances show that these 
expenditures are characterised by a high degree of inertia. The reduction of the 
absolute size of public spending as well as inhibiting their growth rate and the 
share in GDP, was in practice accomplished with great difficulty, gradually and 
produced modest results (Krajewska 2008a, pp.71-78). For this reason, public 
finance theorists often emphasise the relevance of the Wagner law, formulated 
yet in the late nineteenth century, on the steady growth of public expenditure. 
This stems largely from the fact that the level of public expenditure is 
determined by many factors that are not only economic but also historical, 
political and sociological. However, as soon as the first signs of the crisis 
appeared we saw the increased activity in EU countries in terms of counter-
cyclical policies. All EU countries see an increase in budgetary expenditure, 
although the pace of change is clearly differentiated. Public expenditure between 
2007 and 2009 in the countries of the "Old EU" (EU 15) increased steadily by  
4 - 6 percentage points. The situation in the new countries of the Commonwealth 
was much more diverse. The largest expansion of public sector expenditure was 
recorded in the Baltic countries (an increase of 8-10 percentage points in the 
period under consideration), although these countries from the beginning of 
transition pursued a very restrictive fiscal policy and have consistently sought to 
reduce public spending. Poland (along with Hungary and Bulgaria) is within the 
group of countries which during the crisis increased public spending to the least 
extent. This did not protect Poland from growing budget deficit and public debt. 
Some countries, however, fell into a serious debt trap. In five EU countries, the 
deficit exceeded 10% of GDP (Latvia, France, Italy, Ireland, Greece), and public 
debt of 100% of GDP (Greece - 126.8%) and Italy 116.0%). 
  
Table 2. Total general government expenditure, public deficit, and public debt 
Total general government expenditure - % GDP Public deficit - % 
GDP 
Public debt - % 
GDP 
  1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 2007 2008 2009 
Belgium 50.4 50.2 49.1 49.2 49.8 51.1 49.4 52.3 48.6 48.4 50.2 54.2 -0.3 -1.3 -6.0 84.2 89.6 96.2 
Bulgaria 39.4 40.0 41.3 40.9 39.6 39.1 38.5 39.7 34.4 39.7 37.6 40.6 1.1 1.7 -4.7 17.2 13.7 14.7 
Czech Rep. 43.2 42.3 41.8 44.4 46.3 47.3 45.1 45.0 43.7 42.5 42.9 45.9 -0.7 -2.7 -5.8 29.0 30.0 35.3 
Denmark 56.3 55.5 53.7 54.2 54.6 55.1 54.6 52.8 51.6 50.9 52.0 58.2 4.8 3.4 -2.7 27.4 34.2 41.4 
Germany 48.0 48.1 45.1 47.6 48.1 48.5 47.1 46.8 45.3 43.6 43.8 47.5 0.3 0.1 -3.0 64.9 66.3 73.4 
Estonia 39.5 40.1 36.1 34.8 35.8 34.8 34.0 33.6 33.6 34.4 39.9 45.2 2.5 -2.8 -1.7 3.7 4.6 7.2 
Ireland 34.5 34.1 31.3 33.1 33.4 33.2 33.6 34.0 34.4 36.8 42.7 48.9 0.0 -7.3 -14.4 25.0 44.3 65.5 
Greece 44.3 44.4 46.7 45.3 45.1 44.7 45.5 44.0 45.5 46.5 49.2 53.2 -6.4 -9.4 -15.4 105.0 110.3 126.8 
Spain 41.1 39.9 39.1 38.6 38.9 38.4 38.9 38 4 38.4 39.2 41.3 45.8 1.9 -4.2 -11.1 36.1 39.8 53.2 
France 52.7 52.6 51.6 51.6 52.6 53.3 53.2 53.4 52.7 52.3 52.8 56.0 -2.7 -3.3 -7.5 63.8 67.5 78.1 
Italy 49.2 48.2 46.2 48.0 47.4 48.3 47.7 48.2 48.7 47.9 48.8 51.9 -1.5 -2.7 -5.3 103.6 106.3 116.0 
Cyprus 36.7 36.8 37.0 38.2 40.2 45.0 42.8 43.6 43.4 42.2 42.5 45.8 3.4 0.9 -6.0 58.3 48.3 58.0 
 
  
Latvia 40.2 41.9 37.3 34.6 35.6 34.8 35.8 35.6 38.1 35.7 38.8 43.9 -0.3 -4.2 -10.2 9.0 19.7 36.7 
Lithuania 40.1 39.9 39.1 36.8 34.7 33.2 33.3 33.3 33.6 34.8 37.4 43.6 -1.0 -3.3 -9.2 16.9 15.6 29.5 
Luxembourg 41.1 39.2 37.6 38.1 41.5 41.8 42.6 41.5 38.6 36.2 36.9 42.2 3.7 3.0 -0.7 6.7 13.6 14.5 
Hungary 50.4 48.4 46.8 47.2 51.2 49.4 48.7 50.2 52.0 50.0 48.8 50.5 -5.0 -3.7 -4.4 66.1 72.3 78.4 
Malta 43.0 43.1 41.0 43.1 43.2 47.9 45.6 44.6 43.6 42.4 44.8 43.9 -2.3 -4.8 -3.8 61.7 63.1 68.6 
Netherlands 46.7 46.0 44.2 45.4 46.2 47.1 46.1 44.8 45.5 45.3 46.0 51.4 0.2 0.6 -5.4 45.3 58.2 60.8 
Austria 54.0 53.7 52.1 51.6 51.0 51.5 54.0 50.2 49.4 48.5 48.8 52.3 -0.4 -0.5 -3.5 59.3 62.5 67.5 
Poland 44.3 42.7 41.1 43.8 44.3 44.7 42.6 43.4 43.9 42.2 43.2 44.4 -1.9 -3.7 -7.2 45.0 47.1 50.9 
Portugal 40.8 41.0 41.1 42.5 42.3 43.8 44.7 45.8 44.5 43.8 43.6 48.2 -2.8 -2.9 -9.3 62.7 65.3 76.1 
Romania 35.8 39.2 38.6 36.2 35.0 33.5 33.6 33.6 35.5 36.2 38.2 41.0 -2.6 -5.7 -8.6 12.6 13.4 23.9 
Slovenia 45.7 46.5 46.7 47.6 46.3 46.4 45.8 45.2 44.5 42.4 44.1 49.0 0.0 -1.8 -5.8 23.4 22.5 35.4 
Slovakia 45.8 48.1 52.1 44.5 45.1 40.1 37.7 38.0 36.6 34.3 35.0 41.5 -1.8 -2.1 -7.9 29.6 27.8 35.4 
Finland 52.9 51.7 48.3 47.8 48.9 50.1 50.0 50.2 49.0 47.2 49.3 56.2 5.2 4.2 -2.5 35.2 34.1 43.8 
Sweden 58.8 58.1 55.1 54.5 55.6 55.7 54.2 53.9 52.7 51.0 51.5 54.9 3.6 2.2 -0.9 40.0 38.2 41.9 
UK 39.5 38.9 39.1 40.2 41.1 42.1 42.9 44.1 44.2 44.0 47.4 51.7 -2.7 -5.0 -11.4 44.5 52.1 68.2 
Source: Eurostat, Date of extraction Feb. 14, 2011, http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/ 
88                                                      Anna Krajewska, Stefan Krajewski                                        
 
4. Fiscal Policy and Taxes in the Countries of the “Old” European 
Union (EU-15) 
It is generally accepted, that the fiscal function of taxes is the most 
important one. Taxes are levied so that the state can achieve social and economic 
goals. Non-fiscal tax functions, especially redistributive, allocative and 
stabilizing began to play a big role along with the rising popularity of Keynes’ 
theory. Tax system that emerged after World War II seriously considered tax 
extra-fiscal functions. This was reflected in progressive tax, income tax 
allowances, and tax exemptions and deductions, as well as in diversified 
consumption tax rates. Such tax structure made it possible to employ taxes as 
automatic stabilizers. It also allowed the implementation of the stimulatory and 
the allocative function of taxes. 
The Neo-Liberal doctrine approach to taxation is different. It clearly 
emphasizes that taxes should be neutral, the extra-fiscal functions of taxes 
should be limited, taxes should be reduced and tax exemptions abolished. The 
representatives of the supply-side economics were the most explicit in their 
expectations towards taxes. Their postulates were put to practice by Ronald 
Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. This path was followed in many West European 
countries by implementing the tax reforms of the 1980s. Tax progressivity was 
reduced. The scope of tax reduction was increasingly reduced. The lowering of 
income tax rates was coupled with expanding the tax base. Taxes for the richest 
households were gradually reduced and the burden of taxes was shifted on 
indirect taxes and social security contributions. Still, the tax systems in the 
“Old” Europe were diversified both in terms of income tax rates, the number of 
tax thresholds and income tax exemption amounts. Here are some examples, in 
2008 in Ireland and Great Britain there were only two tax rates (respectively 
20%, 41% and  20%, 40%) and 17 tax rates in Luxemburg (from 6% to 46%). 
There were also substantial differences in terms of tax - free income: from EUR 
1830 in Ireland up to EUR 35530 in Sweden (Krajewska 2010, pp. 84, 87). The 
attempts to harmonize VAT rates failed too, the standard rate varies from 15 to 
25% and the reduced rates and the scope of their application vary considerably. 
The tax reforms, performed in the spirit of liberal school 
recommendations, have been introduced gradually and with high resistance (on 
the principle that "taxes do not like revolution"). However, reducing tax 
progression and tax deductions as well as lowering the upper tax thresholds led 
to two negative effects: 
1. reduced government revenues from taxes and limited ability to reduce the 
budget costs led to an increase in public deficit and public debt, 
2. the new tax structure led to a greater social differentiation.  
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The current crisis has deepened these effects and confirmed the saying 
well-known among economists: “When in fear, Keynes is dear”. This was 
reflected in President Obama’s anti-crisis package and then followed by many 
governments in Western Europe with anti-crisis packages covering new tax 
systems. These packages included such activities as (Taxation Trends, 2009, pp. 
13-19): 
1. increased tax exemption amount in many countries (e.g. EUR 40 000 in 
Sweden), 
2. reduced bottom PIT rate (used in many countries, including Denmark, 
France, Germany), 
3. the introduction or increase of the pro-family tax reforms (the Netherlands) 
4. the indexation of tax threshold (for example,  in Luxembourg 9% in all 
brackets), 
5. the introduction of the new additional top PIT rates (e.g., in Great Britain  
a new 50% income tax rate on income in excess of £150000 as of April 1, 
2010 – prior to that rate was 40%), 
6. improved collection of taxes - better tax systems (Italy). 
These measures were justified as follows: the tax relief for the poor will 
increase their consumption demand and stimulate economy. However, raising 
taxes for the rich will not reduce their consumption, and therefore will not harm 
the economy; to the contrary it will only result in reduced savings. 
The decisions on VAT and excise rates are not so precisely oriented. The 
standard VAT rates were temporarily reduced in some countries (Germany, 
Great Britain, Spain, Portugal, and Greece). Preferential VAT rates were also 
reduced (e.g. for construction services in Belgium and for catering services in 
France). However, many countries temporarily increased the excise tax on 
certain products and increased the standard VAT rate (Ireland) (Taxation 
Trends, 2009, 13-19). 
5. Fiscal Policy and Taxes in Poland 
The Government persistent endeavours not to relax the fiscal policy have 
been characteristic of the recent economic policy in Poland. While justifying this 
approach the Government usually uses three arguments: 
a) high Government deficit (over 3.0% GDP) would prevent Poland’s entry 
into the Euro Zone in 2011 or 2012; 
b) the costs of financing the deficit would be very high because Poland would 
have some difficulty in selling securities in the international market on 
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favourable terms (competitive securities from other countries, the weak 
condition of the Polish currency); 
c) high repayments would burden the budget and would excessively 
undermine the investment potential of economy in the future and seriously 
affect its competitive position for many years to come. 
This economic policy was manifested by the endeavours to keep public 
deficit below 3 per cent of GDP. To achieve this under the conditions of 
relatively slow growth of revenue, serious attempts were made to reduce 
expenses (i.e. the “looking for 1.5 per cent of GDP savings in the Ministries” 
campaign at the end of 2008). This concept meant in practice that the budgetary 
measures could not significantly and selectively stimulate consumption and 
investment. The scope of subsidies and subventions was not extended either.  
The difference between economic policy pursued in Poland and that in 
most other countries tends to reflect and question those who chose the 
appropriate approach in the times of crisis. In Poland this problem was clearly 
posed by Jacek Rostowski, the Minister of Finance, who at the beginning of 
September 2009 stated that “…the results of the Polish economy please all. They 
even please more because during that year Poland chose the entirely different 
road than the countries of Western Europe and the United States. Our results are 
the evidence that we have chosen the right road during the crisis and that our 
road proved to be the only one effective” (Rostowski 2009). This is an important 
observation that should be analyzed and verified. 
It seems that this statement can be interpreted in three ways: 
1) the procedure adopted in Poland can be successfully applied in other 
countries contributing effectively to overcoming the crisis; 
2) Poland is actively pursuing the economic policy tailored to special 
conditions within the country and these experiences cannot be applied 
abroad on a larger scale; 
3) Poland’s economic policy during the crisis was characterized by low activity 
and relatively favourable economic situation due to the special 
characteristics and conditions that are rare in other countries. 
Most arguments favour the third interpretation. The most important of 
them involve:  
1. The Polish economy takes advantage of the so-called “backwardness rent” 
consisting of:  
a) The financial sector is relatively underdeveloped. It achieves good 
results based on the traditional, proven instruments. This weakens the 
negative effects of crisis and delays their occurrence. The impact of the 
financial sector on the real sector is still limited. This was proved by the 
fact that in 2008  only 26 per cent of small and medium-sized 
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enterprises benefited from loans (Raport, 2009) although enterprises of 
that size in most countries are generally strongly dependent on external 
financing; 
b) connections with international markets are still relatively modest. For 
example, in Poland exports account for 40 per cent of GDP, while in 
many countries of the “Old” European Union, even in the Czech 
Republic they are above 70 per cent (Statistical Yearbook, 2009, pp. 
875-887). This implies that the effects of the collapse of economies of 
the developed countries are not felt in Poland to the same extent; 
c) as one of the least developed EU countries, Poland benefits from 
abundant, external financial assistance, in excess of EUR 10 billion per 
year (Poland is a biggest beneficiary of EU aid funds). 
2. Poland receives significant financial resources from abroad, mainly from the 
European Union. The funds are assigned for:  
a) the infrastructure investments promoting entrepreneurship, innovation, 
and environmental protection; 
b) consumer spending (EU farm subsidies, sustaining employment, 
severance pay for laid off employees). 
3. High GDP growth rate before the crisis (5-6 per cent annually) slows down 
the fall of Poland’s economy.  
4. Decisions to reduce taxes taken just before the crisis, considerably increased 
demand, especially the consumer demand. These decisions involved:  
a) the reduction of corporate income tax in 2004 (from 27 per cent to 19 
per cent) resulted in reduced budget revenues equivalent to 0.8 per cent 
of GDP,  
b) the reduction of pension contribution  2006- 2007 (from 13 per cent 
down to 6 per cent) resulted in reduced budget revenues equivalent to 2 
per cent of GDP, 
c) the introduction in 2007 of the pro-family income tax allowance which 
made it possible to deduct expenses for bringing up children from 
personal income tax, 
d) the introduction in 2009 of a two-tier PIT scales (18 and 32 per cent) in 
place of the previous (19, 30 and 40 per cent) scale, resulted in reduced 
budget revenues equivalent to 1.5 per cent of GDP). 
In 2004, the government headed by Prime Minister Leszek Miller cut the 
CIT rate from 27% down to 19%. At the same time, natural persons running 
businesses and settling their taxes under the general rules (i.e. progressively) 
were allowed to switch to a flat rate of 19%. In 2004, this opportunity was used 
by 159,977 taxpayers. By 2008, their number almost tripled, growing to as many 
as 463,115 taxpayers. 
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The year 2004 was a good time for Polish economy. The country’s GDP 
grew by 5.3%, in the enterprise sector the growth rate in gross profit on sales 
increased by 6%. Given the circumstances, enterprises did not urgently need 
governmental support offered at the cost of the state budget. The reduction in 
CIT should be interpreted as an obvious gesture of good will made by the post-
communist prime minister towards the business community, however one 
depriving the budget of part of its revenues. As estimated, in the wake of the 
decision CIT revenues were lower by PLN 8-10 billion a year between 2004 and 
2009. 
Another thing one has to bear in mind is that on 1 May 2004 Poland 
became an EU member state. If Poland had behaved as the “old” Community 
members did, a more probable course of events would have been increases in tax 
liabilities. This opinion is based on the decisions Ireland, Greece, Spain and 
Portugal made on entering the European Union. The countries were then the 
most similar to Poland in terms of their economic development and economic 
structure. All of them increased the tax burden for the whole economy (as 
measured by budget revenue to GDP ratio) during the first five years after 
accession. They strove to increase their allocations to infrastructure (to boost 
their economies’ competitiveness), to raise funds necessary to support EU-
funded structural programmes and made efforts to comply with the social 
pressure on meeting the requirements of the European Social Charter, which is 
in force in the European Union (Krajewski, 2009, p. 303). Poland and the other 
new member states opted for a different model. This group of countries started 
with tax cuts and handling repossession claims, hoping that the EU funds would 
help them solve their problems without excessive sacrifices. 
In 2006, Minister Zyta Gilowska initiated a substantial reduction in the 
pension contribution rate. Between 2006 and 2007, the rate decreased from  
13% to 6%, i.e. by as much as 7 percentage points (5.5 p.p. of the reduction 
falling to the employees and 1.5 p.p. to the employers). As a result, the public 
finance sector suffered a serious financial loss, estimated at PLN 23-24 billion  
a year. 
This situation makes us ask the same question again – was the operation 
necessary? Average gross wages were rising in that period at 5-6% a year, so no 
additional steps were necessary to increase them. Although the operation 
distinctly improved employees’ disposable incomes, they neither noticed the 
change nor appreciated it. Entrepreneurs did not perceive the reduction in the 
pension contribution rate as an act tangibly diminishing the tax wedge, either. 
From their perspective, the following decrease in the labour costs was really 
minimal. The whole operation had political roots and its intended goal was to 
distribute the additional, unexpected surplus in budget revenues. The deputy 
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prime ministers representing the coalition parties, Roman Giertych and Andrzej 
Lepper, being aware that extra funding was available, were already starting to 
give money away, promising it to teachers, pensioners, and farmers, but minister 
Gilowska was faster. She decided to give presents to everyone. 
In 2007, the government introduced a family allowance that allowed the 
taxpayers to deduct the amount of PLN 1,145.08 from their income tax. After  
a year, the amount was raised to PLN 1,173.70 PLN. In 2007, the family 
allowance option was exercised by 3,973,668 taxpayers, i.e. 16.43% of their 
total number. The deducted allowances totalled PLN 5,431,984 thousand PLN, 
i.e. 13.52% of the income tax net of social insurance contributions. Owing to the 
allowance, the costs of rearing 6,017,284 children were partly reimbursed. An 
average deduction per taxpayer was 1,367 PLN and per child 903 PLN 
(Informacja, 2008, p. 33). A year later, 4,205,909 taxpayers (17.21%) decided to 
exercise this option. The total amount deducted due to the allowance was 
6,043,553 thousand zlotys (i.e. 11.76% of the income tax). The allowance was 
used to reimburse the rearing costs of 6,357,837 children. The average amounts 
of deductions were PLN 1,437 per taxpayer and PLN 951 per child (Informacja, 
2009, p. 32). 
The family allowance is the most noticeable, pro-family feature of tax 
policy in Poland. The Polish tax system operated before 2006 was not friendly to 
families and clearly differed from those used in other countries (Krajewska, 
2008b). The tax-free amounts are limited; the bottom tax threshold (first 19% 
and then 18% from 2009) is high compared with those functioning in other 
countries. Tax relieves for families (allowing the taxpayers to cover the costs of 
their children commuting to schools, tuition fees for child education in primary 
and vocational non-public schools, and for tertiary education) were first limited 
and then liquidated. Therefore, the family allowance is a step in the right 
direction, however insufficient. Besides, the allowance is designed differently 
than its EU equivalents. It is deducted from tax due and not from income, so 
parents have to have appropriately high incomes to be able to use it. This means 
that the allowance favours well-off families with many children, while most 
multiple-children families in Poland are quite poor. It is difficult to understand 
why the Law and Justice Party (PiS) that declares its pro-family orientation 
enacted an allowance of such construction. 
Owing to another PiS initiative, natural persons have been allowed since 
2009 to settle their taxes according to two tax bracket: 18% for incomes to 
85,528 PLN and 32% above that level. This change is estimated to reduce 
budget revenues by PLN 16-17 bn. 
The above tax cuts seriously strained the public sector’s revenues. Table  
3 presents the estimated financial impacts of tax reductions in Poland. The data 
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show that the public sector’s revenues fell by PLN 38-40 billion in 2008 and by 
PLN 55-56 billion in 2009. The incomes available to households and enterprises 
increased by the same amount, most of which were allocated to consumption 
and investments. This means that the demand-boosting policy with measures 
typically employed in periods of recession and crisis was launched in Poland 
ahead of time, even before the crisis appeared. Naturally, even though the 
measures were not intended as pre-emptive, their favourable effects coincided 
with the crisis coming to Poland. 
Table 3. Financial impacts of tax cuts in Poland 
Years Decision Lower public sector’s 
revenue 
2004 CIT reduced from 27% to 19% PLN 8-10 bn a year 
2006-2007 pension contribution reduced from 13% to 6% PLN 23-24 bn a year 
2007 a family allowance deductible from PIT 
PLN 5.5 bn – 2007 
PLN 6.0 bn – 2008 
2009 introduction of two brackets of PIT: 18% and 32% PLN 16-17 bn 
2008 cumulated effects of tax cuts PLN 38-40 bn 
2009 cumulated effects of tax cuts PLN 55-56 bn 
Source: calculated by the authors, based on the GUS and Ministry of Finance data. 
At the same time, the present government could take credit for the 
relatively good economic situation taking no anti-crisis actions. Poland was the 
only country in Europe in 2009 to show a positive rate of economic growth. It 
must be remembered, though, that demand did not collapse owing, at least 
partly, to the earlier tax cuts made by the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and 
PiS. The Polish economy was additionally stabilised by structural funds flowing 
from the Community and by the so-called „advantages of backwardness”, i.e. its 
underdeveloped banking system, a relatively small volume of consumer and 
enterprise loans, rather unsophisticated banking instruments (banks could profit 
enough operating traditional instruments) and relatively weak ties between 
Poland’s economy and foreign markets. 
It is also worth stressing that in Poland, as in the other transitional 
economies, reductions in income taxes are accompanied by increases in indirect 
taxes (VAT and excise tax). The data presented in Table 4 show, however, that 
in Poland this process develops much faster than elsewhere. 
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Table 4. Indirect taxes as the proportion of total tax revenue (%) 
Years Poland EU-15 EU-102) EU-27 
1995 38.3 35.1 39.0 37.2 
2000 38.8 35.2 40.3 37.6 
2001 38.8 35.1 39.8 37.4 
2002 40.3 35.5 40.1 37.8 
2003 40.9 35.0 40.9 38.3 
2004 41.5 35.8 41.5 38.8 
2005 42.3 35.8 42.7 39.1 
2006 42.8 35.8 41.4 39.1 
2007 41.7 35.3 41.4 38.4 
1995-2007 
difference 
+3.4 +0.2 +2.4 +1.2 
1)
 Inclusive of contributions to social insurance 
2)
 Without Malta and Cyprus 
Source: calculated based on Taxation trends in the European Union…, p. 255. 
Although indirect taxes are fiscally efficient, easier to collect and less 
painful (as they are built into prices), there is one significant disadvantage to 
them: because they are degressive, the tax burden moves onto the poorer strata 
of the society. As a result, social inequalities become more distinct. 
Statistical investigations into the redistributive consequences of consumer 
taxes in Poland between 1995 and 2006 demonstrate that (Dobrowolska, 2008): 
1) The burden of indirect taxes paid by households increased in the period in 
question from 7.48% in 1995 to 11.23% in 2006. 
2) The poorest households usually paid more in indirect taxes. Average tax 
burdens borne by selected income decile groups were as follows:  
I – 11.88%, 
X – 8.87%. 
3) The extending gap between tax burdens carried by the I and X decile groups 
proves that indirect taxes are becoming increasingly regressive. In 1995, the 
tax burden on households in the X decile group was by 2.9 p.p. smaller than 
that in the I decile group. By 2006, the difference increased to 5.28 p.p. 
4) The preferential VAT rates fail to perform a distributive function, because 
households in different decile groups benefit from lower VAT rates to  
a similar degree. 
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5) As a result of further adaptation of Polish VAT and excise taxes to EU 
requirements the poorest households and farmers will have to carry the 
heaviest tax burden. 
Despite the above effects of indirect tax rises, the taxes can be expected to 
grow. The reason is the fast swelling budget deficit in Poland, from PLN 24.3 
billion in 2008 to PLN 52.2 billion projected for 2010 (exclusive of expenditures 
necessary to repair the damage caused by the flood). Prof. Witold Modzelewski, 
director of the Tax Studies Institute, estimates that VAT will grow from 22 to 
24%. An excise tax on cigarettes, alcohol and energy will also have to be 
increased (Modzelewski, 2010). 
There are no visible signs, in Poland’s economic policy, of active policies 
that could be regarded as the reaction to symptoms of crisis. The State Treasury 
guarantee for bank deposits (necessitated by the decisions of other EU countries) 
cannot be regarded as one. A modest state support for operations of the banking 
system (credit campaign) or some credit facilities for entrepreneurs cannot be 
regarded as such either. 
It is typical that the so-called anti-crisis package in Poland took a very 
long time to develop, and was delayed, but could have played a positive role, in 
the development of labour relations. 
According to the Minister of Finance there would be two important 
methods of behaviour in the anti-crisis package (Rostowski 2009): 
1. Restrained Government spending. Wages in the public sector in 2010 are to 
be kept at the 2009 level and material and investment expenditures are to 
be reduced by 10 per cent. Fiscal discipline is to be maintained in the whole 
public finance sector. It is clear however, that the efforts that inhibit the 
expenditures have not produced expected results. The soaring public deficit 
is expected due to drastic reduction in Government revenue. The budget 
deficit is likely to be nearly 4 per cent and the public finance deficit (central 
and local governments deficits put together) equal to 8 per cent of GDP. 
This increasingly difficult budgetary situation (and in public finance too) 
indicates that one should not expect additional supply of money to 
overcome the crisis1. Chances for the future active interaction are in 
practice low.  
2. The program of privatization on a large scale, which should influence the 
budget in the next two years, is expected to bring budget revenue to almost 
                                                 
1
 For example, Poland has been the only country in which Opel cars are made, which has not 
supported financially this production. Poles have not created incentives to buy new cars, what  
a number of EU countries have done. It is an impressive evidence of our inaction, but perhaps also 
of our weaknesses. 
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3 per cent of GDP. Successful implementation of this program, called “the 
reform” by the Minister of Finance, will determine Poland’s public debt, 
which in relation to GDP may exceed 55 per cent limit in 2010. This would 
mean the collapse of the current fiscal policy in Poland and enormous 
economic difficulties (it is difficult to drastically reduce payroll, so there 
would be no money to invest).  
This situation will probably prompt the sale of the best national 
“silverware”: the largest and most profitable companies owned by the State (oil 
and gas processing, mining and copper processing) at relatively low prices. One 
cannot expect that such measures would be generally accepted. Would it be 
better to sell government securities, even under relatively unfavourable 
conditions? 
One can see here how delicate and unstable the Polish economic policy is 
and how uncertain the future of Poland’s economy, despite optimistic 
declarations made by many politicians and economists. 
For the Polish economy (in the near future) it is crucial to prevent the 
sharp increase in unemployment (currently around 12 per cent) and to prevent 
decrease in consumption. This depends largely on the attitude and actions of the 
Government. So far, the Government unilaterally assumed that the collapse will 
not take place in these fields because of two reasons: the interplay of favourable 
circumstances (as mentioned above) and the high efficiency of information and 
media coverage, making the public (including the business community) aware, 
that the situation of the Polish economy is and will be relatively stable (the main 
argument is the increase in GDP) 
It seems that this second aspect has played a positive role and some 
entrepreneurs have been convinced not to cut down employment because the 
economy has not been breaking down quickly and will return to the path of 
sustained growth, whereas the re-acquisition of appropriate staff takes time and 
considerable resources. In many households, despite the understandable anxiety 
about the future, there are no signs of serious reduction in consumption because 
the belief prevails that there is no real threat of job insecurity or the concern of 
declining income. 
The mood, however, may deteriorate, especially if it appears that the 
Government has lost control over the deficit and GDP begins to decline. 
Therefore, efforts should be made to: 
• quickly show that the anti-crisis package is operating smoothly and on  
a large scale, 
• lower interest rates to curb the growth of the Polish Zloty exchange rate and 
to create conditions conducive to exports, 
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• improve access to relatively cheap consumer and investment credits (lower 
interest rates, ease the criteria for granting credits, and extend the 
government credit guarantees). 
6. Conclusions 
The most developed countries of the global economy have followed an 
active and expansionary fiscal policy aimed at stimulating investment and 
consumption demand since the beginning of the current crisis. Additionally, the 
economies have been supplied with hundreds of billions or even trillions of 
dollars and euros. This has led to a sharp increase in the budget deficit, for 
example, from a few to several percent of GDP in one year in the U.S., UK and 
Ireland. Consumer demand has been stimulated by lowering taxes (directly or 
indirectly). 
Changes in the Polish tax system have been moving in a direction other 
than the tax reforms in the EU-15. Tax cuts carried out between 2004 and 2009 
were to a large extent random and were motivated by political considerations. In 
practice, it turned out, however, that they triggered the demand mechanisms that 
made the economic crisis in Poland run smoother than in other countries. 
However, in 2010, lower Government revenues due to tax cuts led to  
a significant increase in public sector deficit (about 8% of GDP). 
In Polish conditions, one cannot apply the tax system on a major scale to 
overcome the crisis. The announced VAT increase (up to 23% over the next 
three years) as of 2011, can increase revenue by only 0.3 to 0.4% of GDP. In this 
concept, implemented over many years, economic development is promoted. 
The basis of this concept is to create facilities (including financial), designated 
directly for entrepreneurs. The reduction of their tax burden is very important 
here. This is a controversial solution, not applied (at least not to the same extent 
as in Poland) in most countries, especially the developed and democratically 
governed.) Western tax systems tend to spread the burden across all social 
groups with different income levels. When lowering taxes, generally the low 
income social groups are affected and when increasing taxes, the high income 
social groups are involved. In Poland, the opposite is true.  
In most countries of the "old" EU and in the U.S.A. taxes (including 
business taxes) are relatively high, and the promotion of entrepreneurship is 
more focused on the creation of infrastructure conducive to economic 
development (highways, airports, telecommunications, Internet, indigenous 
technical thought, education on high level, good health care). Funding for these 
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purposes comes from relatively high taxes. Poland has still poorly developed 
infrastructure, which clearly hampers its economic activity. 
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SPECYFIKA POLITYKI FISKALNEJ W POLSCE W OKRESIE KRYZYSU – 
JEJ PRZYCZYNY I KONSEKWENCJE 
 
Obecny kryzys skłonił niemal wszystkie kraje do prowadzenia aktywnej polityki 
gospodarczej. W USA i krajach UE dużą wagę w pobudzaniu gospodarki przypisuje się 
polityce fiskalnej i podatkom. Działania podejmowane w Polsce odbiegają od 
standardów światowych, a decyzje dotyczące podatków mają z reguły charakter 
polityczny. W artykule podjęta jest próba przedstawienia rozwiązań z zakresu polityki 
fiskalnej podejmowanych na Zachodzie oraz wyjaśnienia specyfiki polskiej gospodarki  
i prowadzonej polityki antykryzysowej. 
